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has never been documented36 Second, those most affected by arrest records are often those least likely to pursue costly litigation81
In order to protect this area of privacy from further governmental
encroachment, legislative action must be taken. Only the legislature,
through the use of legislative hearings, can effectively probe into
the closed system of criminal identification, and determine the usefulness of arrest records in light of the critical threat to individual
privacy which they present. Furthermore, only the legislature can
establish a statutory requirement enforceable in all cases.88 Though
the ruling in the instant case is undoubtedly an important step in
protecting this sphere of privacy, perhaps its greater significance
is that it may serve as a warning light to the legislature indicating
that the time for action is at hand.
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School authorities suspended the fifteen-year-old petitioner from
school attendance based upon his violation of the school dress

code.' An action was brought by the petitioner and his parents in
36.
"It should be noted that usefulness of arrest records remains unproven since
the closed system maintained by police impairs the ability to document usefulness."
Comment, Retention and Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 850, 855 n.23 (1971).
37. "For most of those arrested-too poor, too ignorant, and often too disheartened
to complain-the only adequate remedy may lie either in severely curtailing any use
of records of arrests, or in eliminating altogether their maintenance in a file associated
with the Individual's name." Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 4.95 n.61 (1971).
38. The statute should include two basic provisions. First, it should require that
arrest records be returned to any person arrested for either a misdemeanor or a
felony when the proceedings against that person have been dismissed, or when that
person has been acquitted, unless the state can show a "compelling" interest for their
retention. Second, the statute should list those particular crimes where, based on a
legislative investigation of the usefulness of arrest records In preventing crimes, the
state is thought to have a "compelling" interest justifying retention of arrest records.
Devising the second provision to such a statute will be an arduous task. But
it is precisely because the legislature has the necessary resources to make a comprehensive analysis of this problem, that the decision-making should be left to that body and not
to the courts. It is within the special competence of the legislature to study this
question, and to make reasoned Judgments based on its findings.
1. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
The pertinent regulations in effect at the time of Stephen's expulsion provided
follows:
a. all hair is to be worn clean, neatly trimmed around the ears and back
of neck, and no longer than the top of the collar on a regular dress or
sport shirt while standing erect. The eyebrows must be visible and no
part of the ear can be covered. The hair can be in a block cut.
b. The maximum length for side burns shall be the bottom of the ear lobes.
Id. at 1070-71.
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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

seeking re-admission and a declaratory judgment to overturn the
dress code regulation governing the length and style of male student's hair. It was asserted that these regulations violated both
petitioner's and his parent's personal rights as guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. 2 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri denied relief,3 and the case was
brought to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court reversed
the lower court decision and held that the dress code was invalid
and unenforceable where such regulation was unnecessary to the
high school's mission of education. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F. 2nd
1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
Essentially, the appellate court asked two questions: first, does
the student's interest in wearing long hair enjoy any special constitutional protection, and second, if it does, what kind of showing
must a school board make in order to override this interest?
Federal courts have generally found themselves engrossed in
the enforcement of various hair regulations especially when in recent years these regulations have touched the fringe of constitutionally protected rights.4 In February of 1968, the Supreme Court
decided Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 5 at which time courts began to take a more objective view of
personal appearance matters. Factually, the case involved the
wearing of black armbands in protest of the Vietnam war.6 Al2. The court dismissed any ruling upon invasion of the parents' rights. The claim
asserted by the parents was that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids state intrusion
into the parent-child relationship. But the court found that the record in this case failed
to reveal any direct invasion of the parents' rights. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d
1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. Bishop v. Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
4. Bishop v. Colaw, 460 F.2d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 1971). It should be noted that
the preference for federal courts over state courts can, at least in part, be attributed
to the reluctance of state courts to rule that school regulations are beyond the control
of the local school board. Generally, the state's delegation of rule-making authority to
the board is very broad. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-21-19 (1971). Most courts have
refused to strike down any rule that is not plainly unrelated to the efficient management of the school. See, e.g., Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923);
Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967); Antell v. Stokes,
287 Mass. 103, 191 N.E. 407 (1934) ; Jones v. Day, 127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906 (1921).
But eee Wright v. Board of Education, 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922); Scott v.
Board of Education, 61 Misc. 2d 333, 305 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1969).
5. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6. The case involved three public high school students who were suspended from
school for wearing black armbands to protest American policy in Vietnam. The school
regulation provided that anyone who wore the armband to school would be requested to
remove it before action would be taken. Upon refusal to remove the armband the
student would be suspended until he returned without it. The student plaintiffs sought
both an injunction to restrain school officials from disciplining them and for nominal
damages. The District Court dismissed the complaint, Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 258 F.Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the
ground that the regulation was within the school board's power despite the absence
of any finding of a disturbance being caused by the activity. Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and declared that petitioner's
conduct was within the protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth in the absence of a showing that the
wearing of such armbands "materially and substantially interferes with the requirements
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though the Tinker Court specifically disavowed the relevance of its
decision to hair style cases, 7 it broadly stated the proposition that
a student does not leave his constitutional rights at the "school
house gate."" In relation to students' constitutional rights generally the court stated:
[W]here there is no finding and no showing that the exercise of the forbidden right would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" the prohibition cannot be sustained. 9
Overall it should be noted that the Supreme Court has refused to review constitutional issues in the area of school regulation
of hairlength. 10 However, Justice Douglas, dissenting from a denial of certiorari, argued:' 1
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the states
are restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person can
be denied education
in a public school because of the length
2
of his hair.1
In contrast to the Supreme Court attitude, the various courts of appeals which have considered the hair regulation issue have done
so against a broad range of constitutional attacks. 13 They have
found several grounds for invalidating such regulations: that they
violate substantive due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment; 14 that they constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment; 15 or that they infringe freedom
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment 16 and made applicof appropriate discipline." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969).
7. The Court stated "[the problem presented in this case [did] not relate to
. . . hairstyles or deportment . . ." Id.

at 507-08.

8. Id. at 506.
9. Id. at 509.
10. E.g., Freedman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Dorrier,
424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Ferrell v. Dallas School Dist.,
392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
11. Ferrell v. Dallas School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
856 (1968).
12. Ferrell v. Dallas School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
13. The Bishop decision contains a brief outline of the circuit rulings in relation to
the hair controversy. See Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1701-03 (8th Cir. 1971).
The Issue of hair lengths and styles has provoked a great deal of Law Review
commentary. See, e.g., 84 1{ARv. L. Prv. 1702 (1971) ; 55 IOWA L. Rv. 707 (1970).
14. See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937
(1970); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Ferrell v. Smith, 310 F.
Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970).
15. See, e.g., Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967); Miller v. Gillis,
315 F. Supp. 94, (N.D. Ill. 1969).
16. See, e.g., Calbillo v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex 1969).
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able to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other
hand, these courts have refused to strike such codes for a variety
of reasons usually characterized by the school's interest in an orderly institution. 17 Not only does the Bishop court reject the constitutional arguments presented by these previous forums, but it
develops a new attack modifying the various pre-existing judicial
attitudes.
"We deem the First Amendment contention to be without merit
in the context of this case," stated Judge Bright for the court, "since
the record contains no evidence suggesting that [petitioner's]
hairstyle represented a symbolic expression of any kind."1 8 Petitioners argued, however, that a "[non-conforming hairstyle] need
not symbolize anything at all . . . to be a constitutionally protected
expression.' ' 19 The court rejected the contention as an unusually
broad reading of the First Amendment.2 0 The court also found it
unnecessary to rule upon the equal protection argument stating
that the instant case "does not fall within the traditional concepts
of invidious discrimination subject to the proscription of the Equal
2
Protection Clause." '
It was held generally that the plantiff did possess a constitutionally protected right of personal appearance while attending
high school. Regardless of the different descriptions, the source of
this right according to the Bishop court is "found within the Ninth
Amendment, 22 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 'privacy penumbra' of the Bill of Rights. ' 23 Judge
Bright looked beyond all the labels utilized by the courts which
frowned upon such codes and uncovered a basic, unenumerated
24
right to govern one's personal appearance.
The existence of rights other than those specifically enumerated
in the Constitution was recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.25 Whether the findings of that decision parallel
such a right as that involved in the hair cases is a tenuous proposition, largely because of the absence of a majority opinion in the
Griswold case. Griswold was similar to the hair cases in that it

dealt with another constitutionally "unenumerated" right -

that of

17. King v. Saddleback Jr. College, 445 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1971); Ferrell v. Dallas
School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1968).
18. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 1074.
20. "Since all conduct cannot be labeled speech even when 'the [actor] intends
thereby to express an idea,' . . . certainly conduct not intended to express an idea
cannot be afforded protection as speech." Id. at 1074.
21. Id.
22. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNST. amend. IX.
23. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971).
24. Id.
25. Griswold v. Conn., 881 U.S. 479 (1965).
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using contraceptives within the privacy of one's home. The Supreme Court recognized this right to be fundamental, but it could
not agree where, within the framework of the Constitution, the right
was guaranteed. Justice Douglas' plurality opinion suggested the
right to be a penumbral right emanating from several amendments, 26
while Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion discussed the Ninth
Amendment at length, claiming that it could be used by the Court
as an interpretive tool since "the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that
are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments, and
an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive." 2 7 Among these rights retained by the people, claimed
Bishop, is the right of personal appearance. "As a freedom which
ranks high on the spectrum of our societal values, it commands
' 28
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The Bishop court took an extensive step in the clarification of
personal appearance rights. It discarded prior defenses and activated the previously little used Ninth Amendment, 29 which the
court felt necessary to protect this unenumerated right.
However, as the Bishop decision indicates, the inquiry into this
personal freedom cannot end at this point because personal freedoms are not absolutes and they yield when they intrude upon the
freedoms of others.3 0 The task, therefore, is to weigh the compet3
ing interests asserted. Burnside v.
' and Blackwell v. Issa2
guena County Board of Education,1 two Fifth Circuit cases decided
on the same day, laid down a standard upon which hair reguIations
could be tested. They were subsequently affirmed and expanded
upon in Tinker.
Both Burnside and Blackwell involved regulations which banned
the wearing of "freedom buttons" by students. The court in Burnside noted the existing interest of the state in maintaining an education system, and that the establishment of such a system required the formulation of reasonable rules and regulations.
They
.Byars

26.
27.

Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 492. Very little has been written about the Ninth Amendment. See generally

B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTa AMENDMENT (1965); Redlich, Are There "Certain
Rights . . . Retained by the People?," 37 N.Y.U.L. R:v. 787 (1962); Kelsy, The Ninth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936).

28. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971).
29. Prior to 1965 and the issuance of the Griswold decision, the United States
Supreme Court had never decided a case on Ninth Amendment grounds. The amendment had, however, been raised by the parties and discussed by the Court in several
pre-1965 cases. For a general listing, see Van Loan, Natural Rfght8 and the Ninth
Amendment, 48 BOSTON U.L. REV. 1, n.3 (1968).
30.

Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075

(8th Cir. 1971).

31. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
32. Blackwell v. Issaguena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
33.

Burnside v.

Byars, 363

F.2d 744, 748

(5th Cir. 1966):

The interest of the state in maintaining an educational system is
a compelling one, giving use to a balancing of First Amendment rights with
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concluded that: "[A] reasonable regulation is one which measurably contributes to the maintenance of order and decorum within
the education system." 3 4
The Supreme Court, in Tinker, approved the test enunciated in
Burnside as proper where the constitutional rights of students collide with school regulations. They also instructed that the state, in
justifying such regulations, "must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint." 35 Moreover, while any expression "in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance,
our Constitution says we must take this risk... .",6
The Bishop court concluded from the evidence that the school
board did not meet the Tinker test. They were unable to prove that
petitioner caused disruption of the educational process, that a sanitation problem existed or that a correlation existed between classroom performance and the length of a person's hair. "Finally, we
cannot accept the argument that uniformity of appearance must

be maintained in order to prevent 'polarization'.

.

.

.3

It is inter-

esting to note that the court mentions the question of sex discrimination, a possible defense in future decisions.38
With the instant case, the dress code controversy has reached
another plateau. Bishop has clarified and sharpened the constitutional theories under which hair regulations can be attacked; it has
added a new dimension to the conflict without shattering the foundation of the educational system. In determining that the student
has an important interest in preserving his freedom of personal
the duty of the state to further and protect the public school system. The
establishment of an educational program requires the formulation of rules and
regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly program of classroom learning.
The court then proceeded to say such rules and regulations had to be "reasonable"
within the school authorities' power and discretion.
34. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
The court In Burnsdale failed to find from the evidence that the buttons were
calculated to cause or in

fact did cause a

disturbance.

Consequently they held that the

regulation was "arbitrary and unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringement on the
students' protected right of free expression in the circumstances revealed by the record."
Id. at 748-49.
35. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
36. Id. at 509. See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
37. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (1971).
The court also viewed the manner in which the code was adopted and then stated
"Nor does the acceptance of the dress code by the majority of the St. Charles community
and students justify the Infringement of Petitioner's liberty to govern his personal appearance." See Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 1074. There have been two district court cases in the Eighth Circuit
which have upheld regulations similar to those in the Instant case. Carter v. Hodges,
317 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Giangreco v. Cedar School Dist, 313 F. Supp. .776
(W.D. Mo. 1969).
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appearance, the court has arrived at a new constitutional basis the Ninth Amendment.
What has been decided is that a state's invasion into the personal
rights and liberty of an individual, of whatever age or description,
should and does present an issue worthy of judicial review.3 9 The
resolution of this issue will involve the balancing of competing
interests, and strong justifications on the part of school administrato infringe
tors will be required before such regulation is allowed
40
upon an individual's right of personal appearance.
JAMES
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Plaintiff, a seven-year-old child, brought an action against the
administrator of her stepfather's estate to recover for injuries suffered in an automobile accident, allegedly resulting from her stepfather's negligence. The trial court dismissed the action holding
that the stepfather stood in loco parentis to the child and was therefore immune from liability because of parent-child tort immunity.
The trial court also stated that even if plaintiff could maintain the
action, her stepfather would not be liable because she was a gratu39. However, on March 27, 1972, the United States Supreme Court declined to consider the issue of regulation of hair styles. Freeman v. Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972),
denying cert. to 448 F.2d 258 (1971). Mr. Justice Douglas dissented and stated in a
very brief comment that eight circuits have now passed on the question of:
whether a public school may constitutionally refuse to permit a
student to attend solely because his hairstyle meets with disapproval of
the school authorities.
. . . [O]n widely disparate rationales, four have upheld school hair regulations (see Freedman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (C.A. 10, 1971); King v.
Saddleback Jr. College, 445 F.2d 932 (C.A. 9, 1971); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424
F.2d 213 (C.A. 6, 1970) ; Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School District, 392 F.2d 697
(C.A. 5, 1968), and four have struck them down (see Massie v. Henry,
__ F.2d
(C.A. 4, 1972) ; Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (C.A. 8,
1971) ; Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (C.A. 1, 1970); and Breen v.
Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (C.A. 7, 1969).
I can conceive of no more compelling reason to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of such magnitude, on an issue of importance bearing on First Amendment and Ninth Amendment rights.
Id. at 1032.
40. See Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1972), in which
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court decision holding that the
regulation in question was invalid as violative of an individual's constitutional rights of
privacy and personal freedom. They again used the rational basis test and stated:
This court recently found that no rational relation exists between a similar
school regulation and the educational goals and processes of school administration. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8 Cir. 1971). We affirm the decision of the District Court under the analysis written in Bishop.
Id. at 77t.

